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President Obama’s administration has ushered in a banner period for nuclear issues, and the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (”CTBT”) has figured prominently among them. In his
benchmark April 2009 speech in Prague calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons, President
Obama added that his administration would “immediately and aggressively” pursue US ratification
of the treaty. In September, President Obama presided over the United Nations (”UN”) Security
Council summit meeting that adopted Resolution 1887, which ”enshrines our shared commitment
to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons” and also calls on states to ”refrain from conducting
a nuclear test explosion and to sign and ratify the CTBT, thereby bringing the treaty into force at
an early date . . . .”
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INTRODUCTION
President Obama's administration has ushered in a banner
period for nuclear issues, and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-
Ban Treaty ("CTBT") has figured prominently among them. In
his benchmark April 2009 speech in Prague calling for the
elimination of nuclear weapons, President Obama added that his
administration would "immediately and aggressively" pursue US
ratification of the treaty.' In September, President Obama
presided over the United Nations ("UN") Security Council
summit meeting that adopted Resolution 1887, which "enshrines
our shared commitment to the goal of a world without nuclear
weapons"2 and also calls on states to "refrain from conducting a
* Jenifer Mackby served as secretary of the negotiations on the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and the Group of Scientific Experts in Geneva as well as
secretary of the Working Group on Verification at the CTBT Organization Preparatory
Commission in Vienna. This Essay is based on a book she is co-authoring on the
verification of the CTBT to be published by Springer in 2011.
1. See Barack H. Obama, U.S. President, Remarks in Prague, Czech Republic (Apr.
5,2009).
2. See Barack H. Obama, U.S. President, Remarks at the United Nations [UN]
Security Council Summit on Nonproliferation and Nuclear Disarmament in New York
City, U.S. (Sept. 24, 2009).
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nuclear test explosion and to sign and ratify the CTBT, thereby
bringing the treaty into force at an early date . . . ."
This was followed in April 2010 by a new Nuclear Posture
Review, which is the first to refer to the elimination of nuclear
weapons and which also states that " [r] atification of the CTBT is
central to leading other nuclear weapons states toward a world of
diminished reliance on nuclear weapons, reduced nuclear
competition, and eventual disarmament."4 An unprecedented
gathering of world leaders at the Nuclear Security Summit in
Washington, DC, in April 2010 was followed by the signing of the
Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms ("New START") by President Obama
and Russian President Medvedev.5 Shortly thereafter, states
parties of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty ("NPT") adopted
a final document at the May 2010 Review Conference that called
on all states to "refrain from any action that would defeat the
object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban
Treaty pending its entry into force, in particular with regard to
the development of new types of nuclear weapons."6
Beginning with the proposal by Indian Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru in 1954 to the UN General Assembly,
numerous generations have chased the elusive goal of a treaty
banning nuclear explosive testing. Experts believe that a ban on
nuclear explosions will curtail the capabilities of states parties to
develop more advanced nuclear weapons and prevent an aspiring
nuclear state from proving its capability.7 It would thus impede a
nuclear arms race and is seen as a measure to strengthen the
NPT, which calls for nuclear disarmament in its Article VI, as will
be discussed below.
The achievement of a test-ban treaty has run into obstacles
each time it has been considered since 1958, particularly
regarding verification issues. Another less apparent obstacle has
3. S.C. Res. 1887, 1 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1887 (Sept. 24, 2009).
4. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW REPORT 13 (2010).
5. See generally Tom Z. Collina, New START Signed; Senate Battle Looms, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY, May 2010, at 38.
6. 2010 Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, New York, U.S., May 3-28, 2010, 83, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol.
I) (June 18, 2010) [hereinafter 2010 NPT Review Conference].
7. See generally COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE
REPORT NO. 62: U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY (2009).
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been the international political situation. For example, in 1979,
with the completion of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II
("SALT II"), experts thought that a test-ban treaty was the next
logical step, and there were high expectations that one would be
negotiated.8 However, a new atmosphere of tension surrounding
the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan put both agreements on
the back burner.
Almost forty years after the proposal by Prime Minister
Nehru, in August 1993 countries in the Conference on
Disarmament ("CD") in Geneva decided to negotiate a test-ban
treaty. The mandate noted:
The Conference on Disarmament,
Taking note of initiatives regarding the negotiation of a
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTB),
Convinced that, to contribute effectively to the
prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its
aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore
to the enhancement of international peace and security, a
CTB should be universal and internationally and effectively
verifiable ....
[I] n order to achieve this goal, it is important that a CTB be
multilaterally negotiated.9
The United Nations General Assembly adopted the CTBT in
September 1996 by a vote of 158 to 3 (Bhutan, India, and Libya),
with five abstentions (Cuba, Lebanon, Mauritius, Syria, and
Tanzania).1o As of November 2010, the CTBT claims 182
signatures and 153 ratifications." States that have ratified have
effectively signaled that the verification of the treaty suffices for
them. The ratifying countries include three of the permanent
members of the Security Council ("P5") (France in 1998, the
8. See, e.g., Henry Trofimenko, SALT II: A Fair Bargain, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS,
June 1979, at 30.
9. See Conference on Disarmament, Decision on Agenda Item 1 "Nuclear Test Ban"
Adopted by the Conference on Disarmament, U.N. Doc. CD/1212 (Aug. 10, 1993)
[hereinafter Decision on Agenda Item 11.
10. Voting Record for Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Ratification
(A/RES/50/245), UNBISNET, http://unbisneLun.org:8080/ipac2O/ipacjsp?profile=
voting&index=.VM&term=ares50245 (last visited Apr. 4, 2010).
11. Status of Signature and Ratification of the CTBT CTBTO PREPARATORY COMM.,
http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/status-of-signature-and-ratification (last visited Apr. 4,
2011) [hereinafter CTBT Signatories].
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Russian Federation in 2000, and the United Kingdom in 1998),
all members of the European Union, all US allies (NATO as well
as Australia, Japan, and South Korea), and 82 of the 118
members of the Non-Aligned Movement. 2 Of the 114 signatories
to the five nuclear-weapon free zone ("NWFZ") treaties
(Bangkok, Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk, and
Tlatelolco),13 all but seven have signed the CTBT.14
Yet in order to enter into force, the treaty requires
ratification by the forty-four countries that were members of the
Conference on Disarmament and possessed nuclear power and
12. Id.
13. There are five regional NWFZs established by treaty. The provisions of each
zone vary; however, each treaty at a minimum prohibit the stationing, testing, use, and
development of nuclear weapons inside a particular geographical region: the Central
Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone ("CANWFZ") Treaty (Treaty of Semipalatinsk), Sept. 8,
2006, available at cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/aptcanwz.pdf (entered into force 2009)
that includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan; the
African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), Apr. 11, 1996, 35
I.L.M. 698 (entered into force 2009); the Treaty on the Southeast Asian Nuclear-
Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok), Dec. 15, 1995, 1981 U.N.T.S. 129
(entered into force 1996); the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of
Rarotonga), Aug. 6, 1985, 1445 U.N.T.S. 177 (entered into force 1986), which differs
from Tlatelolco in that it includes a ban on nuclear explosions and explosive devises for
peaceful purposes, and prohibits its members from dumping nuclear waste into the
zone's waters; and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), Feb. 14, 1967, 22 U.S.T. 762, 634 U.N.T.S. 281
(entered into force 1968). All existing zones include provisions on full-scope safeguards.
The CANWFZ Treaty is the first of the NWFZ treaties that requires each party to
conclude the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol no later
than eighteen months after the entry into force of the NWFZ treaty and to comply with
the provisions of the CTBT. Establishing a NWFZ in the Middle East has been a priority
of the Non-Aligned Movement ("NAM") for many years and was, along with the
conclusion of the CTBT negotiations, included in the 1995 decision on the indefinite
extension of the NPT. Each of the regional NWFZ treaties includes a protocol to be
signed by nuclear-weapon states providing negative security assurances and respect for
the NWFZs.
14. The seven signatories who have yet to ratify the CTBT are Cuba, Dominica,
Mauritius, Niue, Somalia, Tonga, and Tuvalu. See ANWFZ (Pelindaba Treaty) Membership,
JAMES MARTIN CTR. FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUD. (Dec. 17, 2010),
http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/apmanwfz.pdf- CANFZ (Semipalatinsk Treaty)
Membership, JAMES MARTIN CTR. FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUD. (Feb. 17, 2009),
http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/apmcanwz.pdf; SEAN.TWFZ (Bangkok Treaty)
Membership, JAMES MARTIN CTR. FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUD. (May 28, 2009),
http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/apmseanwfz.pdf; SPNFZ (Rarotonga Treaty)
Membership, JAMES MARTIN CTR. FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUD. (Mar. 18, 2008),
http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/apmspnwfz.pdf.
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research reactors in 1996.15 Slightly less than one-fifth of those
countries have not ratified, and thus entry into force of the treaty
has been delayed. These countries include China, the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("DPRK"), Egypt, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and the United States."6
The United States triggered the negotiations in 1993 at the
Conference on Disarmament and galvanized the international
community to complete the negotiations, which then became
part of the decision relating to the 1995 NPT Review and
Extension Conference. 7 The United States was the first to sign
the treaty in 1996.18 However, in 1999 by a vote of fifty-one to
forty-eight, the US Senate did not provide its advice and consent
to ratification (sixty-seven are needed).19 Before analyzing the
arguments in the United States and elsewhere for and against the
treaty, it is worthwhile to examine the precursors to the treaty.
I. PREVIOUS EFFORTS
A number of attempts were made over the years to codify a
prohibition of nuclear testing; however, the first tangible
inclusion in international law occurred when the Soviet Union,
the United Kingdom, and the United States pledged to negotiate
the cessation of nuclear test explosions in the Treaty Banning
Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, Outer Space and
Under Water, known as the Partial (or Limited) Test Ban Treaty
("PTBT") of 1963.20 At that time the negotiators were not able to
achieve a comprehensive test ban because of a disagreement
about verification: the Soviet Union contended that national
15. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty art. XIV, 1 1, Sept. 24, 1996, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 105-28 (1997), 35 I.L.M. 1439 [hereinafter CTBT]. See Annex II of CTBT for a
full list of parties required to ratify prior to the treaty entering into force.
16. See CTBT Signatories, supra note 11.
17. 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, U.S., Apr. 17-May 12, 1995, Decision 2:
Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, U.N. Doc.
NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I) (May 11, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 Review and Extension
Conference].
18. See CTBT Signatories, supra note 11.
19. See Craig Cerniello, Senate Rejects Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; Clinton Vows to
Continue Moratorium, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Sept./Oct. 1999, at 26.
20. See generally Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in
Outer Space and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43
[hereinafter PTBT].
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technical means of detection and identification would suffice for
verification, while the United States insisted that on-site
inspections would also need to be included. Recognizing that
they did not complete the objective they had set, negotiators
settled on inserting in the preamble of the PTBT the following
words, followed by the first article:
Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test
explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to
continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end
to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive
substances,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit,
to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test
explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place
under its jurisdiction or control:
(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer
space; or under water, including territorial waters or high
seas; or
(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes
radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits
of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such
explosion is conducted. It is understood in this connection
that the provisions of this subparagraph are without
prejudice to the conclusion of a Treaty resulting in the
permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions [emphasis
added], including all such explosions underground, the
conclusion of which, as the Parties have stated in the
Preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve.
2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes
furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any
way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon
test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere
which would take place in any of the environments
described, or have the effect referred to, in paragraph I of
this Article.2'
21. Id. art. 1.
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It is worth noting the first article of this treaty because the
CTBT would, thirty-three years later, derive its basic obligations
from it. Article 1 of the CTBT is almost identical, though
obviously it does not include subparagraphs 1 (a) and (b). The
PTBT contained no provisions for verification, relying mostly on
national technical means. It did not provide any definition of
nuclear weapon test explosion; the same omission in the CTBT
has become an issue among opponents of the treaty. Neither of
the above presented significant obstacles for the PTBT, which
was considered important in large part because it ended the era
of above-ground testing, though it did not prohibit underground
testing. On the other hand, the PTBT never obtained the
signature of France or China, two of the five recognized nuclear-
weapon states ("NWS").22
During the intervening years between the two negotiations,
numerous initiatives called for a test-ban treaty, including one to
simply amend the PTBT so that it would become a complete ban
on nuclear testing in all environments. This led to an
amendment conference in 1991 to extend the PTBT to cover
underground testing, which would have transformed the PTBT
into a test-ban treaty. However, this initiative was unsuccessful.23
While the PTBT helped reduce radioactive contamination and
imposed some limitations on testing, it did not stop the
qualitative advances in nuclear weapons. Thus the international
community eventually called for new negotiations in 1993.
The CTBT has a long-standing connection to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, the cornerstone of the nonproliferation
regime and the most widely adhered to arms control treaty, with
189 states parties.24 The preamble of the NPT refers directly to a
test ban:
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to
the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the
atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble
22. See Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4797.htm#signatory (last
visited Apr. 4, 2011).
23. See 'More Work' Needed to Amend Partial Test-Ban Treaty, U.N. CHRON., June 1991,
at 30.
24. See Status of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, U.N. OFFICE OF DISARMAMENT
AFF., http://unhq-appspub-1.un.org/UNODA/TreatyStatus.nsf (click "NPT" hyperlink
in left-side frame) (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
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to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of
nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to
this end . 25
Further, Article VI states, "Each of the Parties to the Treaty
undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an
early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control."26 In the Review Conferences and other
meetings associated with the NPT, non-nuclear states raise the
CTBT as the first priority of Article VI. This harks back to the
negotiations of the NPT, when a number of non-nuclear
countries proposed specific provisions that they wanted to
include in Article VI, such as the discontinuance of all test
explosions of nuclear weapons, a cutoff of the production of
fissionable materials, and a freeze on the manufacture of nuclear
weapons, among others.27 The United States and the Soviet
Union preferred a simple treaty without linking it to other
measures, which they thought would hinder the conclusion of
the NPT and not lead to agreement on other measures. They
thus wanted to undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith
because, as the US negotiator stated, "it is obviously impossible to
predict the exact nature and results of such negotiations."2 8 In
addition, some US allies, such as Canada and Australia, noted
that it was not reasonable to ask the nuclear-weapon states to
pledge to hard measures when neither China nor France were
participating in the NPT negotiations.29
25. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons pmbl., July 1, 1968, 21
U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT].
26. Id. art. VI.
27. For a full discussion of the negotiations on Article VI of the treaty see 2
MOHAMED I. SHEKER, THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: ORIGIN AND
IMPLEMENTATION, 1959-1979, at 555-648 (1980).
28. Zia Mian, The American Problem: The United States and Noncompliance in the World
of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION:
CLOSING THE COMPLIANCE GAP 266-67 (Edward C. Luck & Michael W. Doyle eds.,
2004).
29. See U.N. GOAR, 22d Sess., 1573d mtg. 25, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1573 (May 23,
1968); U.N. GOAR, 22d Sess., 1570th mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1570 (May 17,
1968); U.N. GOAR, 22d Sess., 1557th mtg. 1 14, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1557 (Apr. 30,
1968).
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This lack of specificity in Article VI has been interpreted in
different ways by the NWS, which contended at the NPT Review
Conferences that they are taking steps towards nuclear
disarmament, and by the non-nuclear weapon states ("NNWS"),
which accuse the NWS of not living up to their obligations and
consequently hold an underlying resentment. During the first
Review Conference of the NPT in 1975, Sweden proposed
immediate negotiations directed towards a treaty banning all
underground nuclear-weapon test explosions as a measure to
halt the nuclear arms race.30 A group of twenty NNWS, led by
Mexico, proposed a protocol to the NPT in which the three
depositary governments would lead in a multilateral treaty
banning all nuclear-weapon testing.31
At the 1990 NPT Review Conference, the lack of progress on
a test-ban treaty was one of the reasons for the inability to achieve
a consensus on a final document. In 1995, the CTBT was linked
to the decision to extend the NPT indefinitely. The decision to
extend the NPT included a set of principles and objectives for
nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. One of these was the
conclusion of the negotiation of a test-ban treaty no later than
1996, as there was no guarantee at the time that negotiations
would soon wrap up. At the 2000 Review Conference, the early
entry into force of the CTBT was the first of a list of thirteen steps
for the implementation of Article VI that were agreed upon in
the final document of the conference.32 The fact that the treaty
has not entered into force is stated to be one of the factors that
led the non-aligned states to voice frustration over certain states
not meeting their Article VI obligations.
The lack of entry into force of the CTBT has also been cited
as a reason the 2005 NPT Review Conference did not adopt a
30. See Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, Geneva, Switz., Working Paper Submitted by Sweden on Article VI, U.N.
Doc. NPT/CONF/C.1/8, in U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF/35/Il (May 30, 1975).
31. See Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, Geneva, Switz., Final Document, Annex II, arts. 3, 5, U.N. Doc.
NPT/CONF/35/I (May 30, 1975).
32. See 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, U.S., Apr. 24-May 19, 2000, Final
Document, at 14, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Part 1) (2000).
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final document.33 While the treaty still has not entered into force,
the final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference stated
that all NWS should "undertake to ratify the [CTBT] with all
expediency," noting that this would encourage other states to do
the same.34 The final document also said that the NWS should
encourage the Annex Two countries (the remaining nine of the
forty-four ratifications required for the treaty to enter into force)
in particular to ratify.35
On a bilateral basis, the treaty between the United States
and the Soviet Union on the limitation of underground nuclear
weapons tests, known as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty
("TTBT"), was signed in 1974 and entered into force in 1990.36
The TTBT prohibits testing warheads having a yield exceeding
150 kilotons (equivalent to 150,000 tons of TNT), thus
establishing a nuclear "threshold."3 7 The preamble and first
article also hark back to a ban on nuclear testing as expressed in
the PTBT:
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to
the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water in its
Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test
explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, and to continue
negotiations to this end,
Noting that the adoption of measures for the further
limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests would
contribute to the achievement of these objectives and would
meet the interests of strengthening peace and the further
relaxation of international tension,
33. See Harald Mfiller, The 2005 VPT Review Conference: Reasons and Consequences of
Failure and Options for Repair, THE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION COMMSSION (Aug.
2005), http://www.blixassociates.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/No3l.pdf.
34. See 2010 NPT Review Conference, supra note 6, at 23.
35. See id.; see also Wolfgang Jans & Kiyoshi Suyehiro, Hydroacoustics, in SCIENCE FOR
SECURY: VERIFYING THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY intro. (2009).
36. Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, U.S.-U.S.S.R,
July 3, 1974, 1714 U.N.T.S. 216 [hereinafter Threshold Test Ban Treaty].
37. See id. art. I; see also Threshold Test Ban Treaty, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/5204.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
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Article I
1. Each Party undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not
to carry out any underground nuclear weapon test having a
yield exceeding 150 kilotons at any place under its
jurisdiction or control, beginning March 31, 1976.
2. Each Party shall limit the number of its underground
nuclear weapon tests to a minimum.
3. The Parties shall continue their negotiations with a
view toward achieving a solution to the problem of the
cessation of all underground nuclear weapon tests.38
Other treaties, such as the recently concluded New START
treaty, recognize the commitments to the obligations contained
in NPT Article VI, although they do not specify the actions that
might satisfy those obligations.39
II. VERIFICATION OF THE CTBT
The CTBT prohibits states parties from carrying out any
nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion in
any place under their jurisdiction or control. The verification
system of the CTBT is designed to provide a high level of
confidence that clandestine nuclear explosions will be detected
by the international community. States wanted the treaty to
include extensive verification provisions in order to be "universal
and internationally and effectively verifiable," as stipulated in the
mandate given the negotiators in 1993.40 The resulting provisions
for verification are unprecedented, with 337 stations and
laboratories in over ninety countries around the world.41 This
International Monitoring System ("IMS") employs four
integrated technologies, with three waveform techniques-
38. See Threshold Test Ban Treaty, supra note 36, pmbl., art. I (footnote omitted);
see also PTBT, supra note 19 and accompanying text.
39. Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms pmbl., U.S.-Russ., Apr. 8, 2010, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf [hereinafter New START
Treaty].
40. See Decision on Agenda Item 1, supra note 9, pmbl.
41. See Ola Dahlman et al., Cheaters Beware, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Jan./Feb.
2002, at 30; CTBT: Ending Nuclear Explosions, CTBTO PREPARATORY COMM'N,
http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user-upload/public-information/CTBTEnding_
NuclearExplosions-.web.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
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seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound-and two radionuclide
techniques for the detection of radioactive gases and particles. 42
The seismic system includes fifty primary and 120 auxiliary
land-based seismic stations distributed around the world to detect
underground nuclear explosions, down to low yields.43 The basis
for this seismic network derived from the Group of Scientific
Experts, which started working in 1976 under the CD on seismic
verification issues for a test-ban treaty. There experts from
around the world examined these issues throughout the Cold
War and carried out a number of technical tests on an
international network. This network formed the core of the
seismic monitoring system that became part of the treaty during
the negotiations from 1994 to 1996. The primary stations provide
continuous data, while the auxiliary stations respond upon
request for additional data. Many of the primary stations are
arrays, with sensors arranged over an area to provide information
on the direction and the speed of the incoming signal. There are
not many arrays outside of the IMS, and the radionuclide,
hydroacoustic, and infrasound networks are unique. All IMS
stations must be certified according to agreed specifications4
The IMS calls for eleven hydroacoustic stations that monitor
possible explosions in the ocean.45 Events in the ocean can be
detected relatively easily because of the Sound Fixing and
Ranging ("SOFAR") channel, which can pick up sounds from
thousands of kilometers away. For example, in 2008, about forty-
four pounds of TNT were detonated off the coast of Japan and
the signal was detected by sensors off the coast of Chile, more
than 3700 miles away. 46
Five of the hydroacoustic stations, called T-phase stations,
are located on islands and are designed to register acoustic
signals that travel in water but convert to seismic signals when
they hit steep coastlines.47 Due to the ease of transmission of
42. See Dahlman et al., supra note 41, at 30.
43. See id. at 32; see also CTBT: Ending Nuclear Explosions, supra note 41, at 2.
44. Glossary, CTBTO PREPARATORY COMM'N, http://www.ctbto.org/glossary(last
visited Apr. 4, 2011).
45. See CTBT: Ending Nuclear Explosions, supra note 41, at 2.
46. SeeJans & Suyehiro, supra note 35, at 19.
47. See Dahlman et al., supra note 41, at 33; Hydroacoustic Monitoring, CTBTO
PREPARATORY COMM'N, http://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/monitoring-
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signals in the oceans and the sensitivity of the hydroacoustic
stations, roughly two-thirds of the planet can be monitored with
only eleven stations. 48 So far, all but one of these stations has
been certified to meet the specifications delineated by the CTBT
Preparatory Commission.
Infrasound, or low-frequency waves that humans do not hear
and that would be generated following an explosion in the air,
are monitored by sixty stations that are distributed around the
globe.49 These stations detect events such as meteorites,
volcanoes, and bolides, in addition to atmospheric explosions.
Infrasound technology was employed for a time in the 1960s and
has generated a great deal of renewed interest in the scientific
community since the advent of the IMS.
The three environments-earth, ocean, and atmosphere-
have wave propagation, with the most rapid being through the
interior of the earth. Placing the stations in the remote, quiet
locations or in places needed for a fairly even distribution
around the globe necessary for monitoring has provided a
challenge. For example, infrasound stations have arrived on
donkeys in the Chilean desert, and hydroacoustic cables have
been laid on the Antarctic ocean floor, among others, which is
accessible by boat only a few months of the year.50
The treaty provides for eighty radionuclide stations, half of
which will also detect noble gases.5 1 The gases may be detected if
they escape from underground nuclear explosions, and they are
referred to as the "smoking gun."52 The radionuclide stations
force high volumes of air through a filter paper to collect aerosol
particulates in the atmosphere. Filters are changed regularly, and
analysts examine the filters. Filters may be taken to one of the
technologies-how-they-work/hydroacoustic-monitoring/page-5 (last visited Apr. 4,
2011).
48. See Dahlman et al., supra note 41, at 34-35; FAQs, CTBTO PREPARATORY
COMM'N, http://www.ctbto.org/faqs/?uid=76&cHash=ff5d62bd7e (last visited Apr. 4,
2011).
49. See Elisabeth Blanc & Lars Ceranna, Infrasound, in SCIENCE FOR SECURITY
VERIFYING THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY 11, 12 (2009).
50. See Dahlman et al., supra note 41, at 34.
51. CTBT, supra note 15, protocol, pt. I(C).
52. See Dahlman et al., supra note 41, at 30; see also Radionuclide Data Processing and
Analysis, CTBTO PREPARATORY COMM'N, http://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/the-
international-data-centre/radionuclide-data-processingand-analysis/page-l-radionuclide-
data-processing-and-analysis (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
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sixteen laboratories certified by the treaty for examination. Noble
gas detectors absorb mostly xenon isotopes on filters which are
also analyzed on a regular basis. The CTBT IMS monitoring
stations detected radioactive materials in Japan within a day after
the March 11, 2011 earthquake and tsunami that damaged the
Fukushima Daichi power plant; more than thirty-five
radionuclide stations provided information that followed the
dispersion of the isotopes to eastern Russia, the west coast of the
United States and the northern hemisphere, and by April 13,
2011 the radioactivity had spread to the southern hemisphere,
including Australia and Papua New Guinea. A radionuclide
noble gas station in Yellowknife, Canada detected the first DPRK
nuclear test in 2006.
In order to process, analyze, report, and archive the data
from all 321 stations, the treaty established an International Data
Center ("IDC") that continuously collects data from the stations
by satellite and other communications systems.53 The IDC is
located at the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the CTBTO
Preparatory Commission ("PrepCom") in Vienna, where states
members meet to oversee and direct the implementation of the
treaty. The data from the stations is authenticated to make sure
that they have not been manipulated. The IDC then sends a
compiled event bulletin containing data from the stations to the
member states. Several gigabytes of data from IMS stations are
sent to the IDC in Vienna every day. In addition to automatic
processing, trained analysts review about 160 events each day,
which include earthquakes, mining and other explosions. The
events that are not clearly screened out or are identified as man-
made are listed in a standard screened event bulletin as
potentially suspicious. 5 4 Every day the IDC sends via satellite and
other means of communication the event bulletin to member
states. While this system is automated, human analysts are
essential to the process of analysis and to check that important
events are not ignored. The IDC detected the first "DPRK" test in
2006 with twenty-two seismic stations, and more than sixty seismic
53. CTBT, supra note 15, protocol, pt. I(F)
54. See Waveform Data Processing and Analysis, CTBTO PREPARATORY COMM'N,
http://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/the-international-data-centre/waveform-data-
processing-and-analysis/page-2-waveform-data-processing-and-analysis (last visited Apr. 4,
2011).
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stations detected the second test in 2009. In this instance, had
the treaty been in force, an on-site inspection ("OSI") would
have been helpful to locate the second test.5 5
The negotiators designed the system to be sensitive in the
regions of the former test sites Novaya Zemlya in Russia, Nevada
in the United States, and Lop Nor in China.5 6 Most experts
believe that the system will detect with a high degree of
confidence a militarily significant nuclear test.5 7 Experts who
have been involved in the implementation of the IMS say that it is
able to see down to a magnitude of 3.2 to 3.4 in the northern
hemisphere with a ninety percent probability.5 8 This is almost a
factor of ten below a magnitude 4.0 disturbance like a small
earthquake, which equates to a one-kiloton explosion. In certain
places the system can detect explosions as small as ten tons,
according to some experts.59 Compared to ten years ago,
"significant progress has been made in . . . detection, location,
and identification"; and similar advances are expected in the
next decade.60 An International Scientific Study conducted from
2008 to 2009 found that technological advances in recent years
have increased the possibilities of detecting even small nuclear
tests.61
Should a state party have a concern about possible
noncompliance, it may request a consultation and clarification
process, and it may request an OSI.62 At least thirty of the fifty-
one members of the Executive Council must vote for the
55. See Experts Sure About Nature of the DPKR Event, CTBTO PREPARATORY COMM'N
(June 12, 2009), http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2009/experts-sure-
about-nature-of-the-dprk-event.
56. See 1994-96: Monitoring and Inspection, CTBTO PREPARATORY COMM'N,
http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/1993-1996-treaty-negotiations/1994-96-monitoring-
and-inspection/page-1-199496-monitoring-and-inspection (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
57. See Tremendous Progress in the Build-up of the CTBT's Verification Regime, CTBTO
PREPARATORY COMM'N (Apr. 28, 2009), http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/
2009/fact-sheet-tremendous-progress-in-the-build-up-of-the-ctbts-verification-regime.
58. See, e.g., Kathy Sawyer, Experts Say New Sensing Tools Could Help Ease Concerns on
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, AM. ASS'N FOR ADVANCEMENT SCI. (Aug. 10, 2009),
http://www.aaas.org/news/releases/2009/0810testban.shtml.
59. See id.
60. LESLIE A. CASEY & W. RANDY BELL, NUCLEAR EXPLOSION MONITORING
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ROADMAPS 4 (2010).
61. Nicholas Kyriakopoulos & Thierry H6ritier, System Perfomance, in SCIENCE FOR
SECURITY: VERIFYING THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY (2009).
62. See CTBT, supra note 15, art. IV(C).
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inspection, which may not cover an area exceeding 1000 square
miles.68 Opponents of the treaty believe that the Executive
Council will have a difficult, perhaps impossible, task to obtain
the requisite number of votes because its six regional groups will
vote together within their blocs and this will be a purely political
exercise. In this connection, it should be noted that the members
of the Executive Council are elected taking into account political
and security interests, nuclear capabilities relevant to the treaty,
the number of monitoring facilities in the IMS, expertise and
experience in monitoring technology, and contribution to the
annual budget.64 Treaty supporters believe that states will base
their decisions about whether to proceed with an OSI on
objective, credible, authenticated evidence of noncompliance
coming from information from the certified stations of the IMS.
In addition, the state calling for the inspection can also provide
national information provided by states, as discussed below. OSIs
are to be conducted in a manner that will find the most
information possible without infringing upon the inspected state
party's sensitive facilities or confidential information not related
to the purpose of the inspection.65 This involves a complex set of
provisions, including, "managed access," under which the
inspected state may indicate restricted areas. These areas are not
to exceed four square kilometers, with a total of fifty square
kilometers of exclusion.66
Yet OSIs are intrusive. They may involve seismological
monitoring for aftershocks, measurements of radioactivity on and
below the surface; over-flights, visual inspection, photography,
ground-penetrating radar, magnetic and gravitational field
mapping, and, if necessary, drilling to obtain radioactive samples.
An operational manual will include specifics about exactly where
inspectors are permitted and prohibited from entering, what
kinds of equipment they are allowed to carry, the procedures
they must follow, the training they must receive, etc. A number of
field exercises have been held in order to assist in the
development of the OSI regime, most notably the Integrated
63. Id. art. 11(C), protocol, pt. I(C).
64. Id.
65. Id. art. IV(D).
66. See id. protocol, pt. 11(E).
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Field Exercise in 2008 at Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan.67 This was a
large logistical effort for a relatively small organization, and it
involved bringing more than fifty tons of equipment for five
weeks to the experiment site, where some 200 people worked on
ten different technologies in harsh, cold conditions.68
The results of exercises and work on the elaboration of an
OSI operational manual, training, and other aspects of the
development of the OSI regime are rather mixed: the work has
progressed slower than expected because of the extremely
sensitive aspects of inspecting a country's facilities; the United
States, which has extensive experience and technological
capabilities in this area, did not participate in the efforts for eight
years (2001-2009); and there has not been a sense of urgency
because an OSI cannot take place until the treaty enters into
force.69 The United States rejoined the efforts in 2009 by sending
numerous experts to the meetings in Vienna, and experts believe
that the terms to be included in an on-site manual could be
finalized within a year, given the political and financial resources.
In addition to the monitoring capabilities of the IMS, states
have their own national technical means ("NTM") that they can
submit in the case of concern over noncompliance. NTMs can
include satellites, aircraft and additional monitoring stations that
are not part of the IMS, in particular some 15,000 seismic stations
around the world, and other intelligence-gathering
mechanisms. 70 The negotiators considered including the use of
satellites in the CTBT verification regime; however, it was
determined that this would be too costly.71 Satellites of states may
be equipped with optical bhang meters to detect optical signals
from atmospheric explosions, as well as sensors that detect x-rays,
gamma rays, neutrons, and electromagnetic pulses. Some
67. See Press Release, CTBTO Preparatory Comm'n, Integrated On-Site Inspection




69. The Final Verfication Measure, CTBTO PREPARATORY COMM'N,
http://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/on-site-inspection/the-final-verification-
measure/page-2 (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
70. CTBT, supra note 15, art. IV(A).
71. 1994-1996: Reaching Critical Mass, CTBTO PREPARATORY COMM'N,
http://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/building-theinternational-monitoring-
system/1994-1996-reaching-critical-mass/page-3 (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
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countries have been working on a more recent technology,
Interferometric Synthetic Aperture Radar ("InSAR"), which can
detect small changes in the topography or subsidence in the
earth after a nuclear explosion detonated at a depth of 600
meters or more at the Nevada Test Site.72 It has the potential to
detect underground facilities such as tunnels that could be
associated with preparations for a nuclear test. Experts believe
that InSAR could be used to locate an event within 100 meters,
and thus this could assist OSI teams to find the correct location
so that they could collect radioactive and other evidence of a
nuclear test.73 In the event of a clandestine nuclear test
explosion, there is usually some evidence of the preparations for
the test. The eventual appearance of noble gases is also possible.
Thus, states can use NTMs and the IMS synergistically in
order to augment their monitoring capabilities. They could also
cooperate in data collection and monitoring efforts. A cheater
would not know, therefore, exactly how robust the verification
capabilities are in a given site and could stand a large chance of
being caught; this creates a strong deterrent effect in the treaty.
The assessment of compliance of a state party is a political
process, and the negotiators insisted that the states, rather than
the Technical Secretariat, should make the judgment regarding
whether a state is in noncompliance with the treaty. States will
base their judgment on IMS data, information from the IDC, or
their NTMs, such as information from their own national
monitoring networks or satellites. Following an OSI, each state
party will analyze the data contained in the reports of the
inspection team and decide for itself, or in conjunction with
other states, whether the inspected state was in compliance with
the treaty. 74
By way of comparison, a number of other arms control
treaties contain few if any provisions for verification. Efforts to
develop a verification protocol for the Biological Weapons
Convention ("BWC") were rejected after six years of
72. Gabriele Rennie, Monitoring Earth's Subsurface from Space, S. & TECH. REV.,
Apr. 2005, at 5, 10.
73. Id.
74. See CTBT, supra note 15, art. IV(D).
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negotiations.75 The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty has no
verification provisions; the five treaties establishing NWFZs in
Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, South East Asia, and the
South Pacific contain no functions requirements beyond IAEA
safeguards (and for the Central Asia zone, the IAEA Additional
Protocol is required).76 while the PTBT relied on NTMs." The
NPT incorporates International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA")
safeguards that may be strengthened by an additional protocol. 78
The Chemical Weapons Convention ("CWC") conducts routine
inspections and provides for challenge inspections that will
proceed unless blocked by a seventy-five percent vote in the
Executive Council; this procedure has never been employed.79
Other bilateral treaties between the United States and Russia,
have extensive verification provisions, for example, the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty ("INF"), Treaty on
the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
("START"), and New START.80
The PrepCom was established in 1996 to implement the
monitoring regime of the treaty in order to prepare for entry
into force.8' It includes a Provisional Technical Secretariat to
carry out the tasks mandated by the member states that meet
several times a year in two different Working Groups.82 One
Working Group considers administrative and legal issues and the
75. See Biological Weapons Convention Background Information, U.N. OFFICE AT
GENEVA, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/699B3CA8CO61D490
C1 257188003B9FEE/$file/BWC-BackgroundInf.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
76. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
77. See Limited Test Ban Treaty: Narrative, U.S. DEP'T ST., http://www.state.gov/
www/global/arms/treaties/tbtl.html#l (last visited Feb. 9, 2011).
78. NPT, supra note 25, art. III.
79. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction art. IX, Jan. 13, 1993, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 103-21, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter Chemical Weapons Convention].
80. New START Treaty, supra note 39, art. V; Treaty between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms art. IX, U.S.-U.S.S.R., July 31, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-20
[hereinafter START Treaty]; Treaty between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and
Shorter-Range Missiles art. XII, U.S.-U.S.S.R., Dec. 8, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. 100-11
[hereinafter INF Treaty].
81. Establishment, Purpose and Activities, CTBTO PREPARATORY COMM'N,
http://www.ctbto.org/the-organization/ctbto-preparatory-commission/establishment
purpose-and-activities/page-1-establishmentpurpose-activities (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
82. Id.
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other focuses on building up the verification regime of the treaty.
Upon entry into force, the PrepCom will become the CTBT
Organization ("CTBTO"), composed of a Conference of States
Parties (the principal decision-making organ that will meet
annually), a technical secretariat, and an executive council (the
executive body that will promote implementation and
compliance with the treaty, including approving requests for
OSI)."
The PrepCom has prepared the requisite operational
manuals for seismological, radionuclide, hydroacoustic, and
infrasound monitoring. These manuals, which regulate the
technical operation of the IMS, in addition to the operational
manual on OSI, will be adopted by the first Conference of the
States Parties. The PrepCom will also report to the first
conference on the readiness of the verification regime. Thus, the
objective is a seamless transition from the PrepCom to a CTBTO
that will be able to carry out the provisions of the treaty upon
entry into force. The Provisional Technical Secretariat was
established in 1997 and has been in operation longer than
anticipated. External reviews of the organization and of the
individual programs were conducted to cover the period from
2000 to 2005, and they presented substantive recommendations
to improve the efficiency and financial operation of the
organization.
III. PROPONENTS AND OPPONENTS OF THE TREATY
Two important reports within the United States evaluating
the CTBT were produced in 2009, and they held different
conclusions on the treaty. The Council on Foreign Relations
favored ratification, 84 while the Congressional Commission on
the Strategic Posture of the United States was not able to reach a
consensus on the issue.85 Another important report on the CTBT
will soon be published by the National Academy of Sciences,
83. Entiy into Force, CTBTO PREPARATORY COMM'N, http://www.ctbto.org/the-
organization/ctbto-after-entry-into-force/entry-into-force (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
84. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 7, prnbl.
85. See WILLIAMJ. PERRY ET AL., AMERICA'S STRATEGIC POSTURE: THE FINAL REPORT
OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF THE UNITED
STATES 81 (2009).
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updating the study conducted in 2002,86 and a National
Intelligence Estimate has also been produced.
In the Congressional Commission Report, US opponents of
the treaty argue that the verification provisions are not sufficient
and that other countries might test without being detected.87
They also believe that if the United States ratifies and the others
do not, then it will be obligated to the treaty provisions and will
not be able to test, while other countries might test.88 Critics are
also concerned about maintaining the safety and reliability of the
nuclear weapons over time without nuclear testing. The US
Stockpile Stewardship Program ("SSP") employs advanced
computer modeling, examines fissile materials, and tests non-
nuclear components of the bombs in order to maintain safety
and reliability.89
Maintaining a safe and reliable stockpile of nuclear weapons
without testing remains a challenge for the nuclear weapon
states. The United States employs its Stockpile Stewardship
Program that uses sophisticated computer modeling, tests the
non-nuclear components (of which there are thousands), and
studies fissile materials.90 It also conducts subcritical tests, which
use small amounts of fissile materials without creating a self-
sustained chain reaction.91 These types of tests have been
conducted underground at the Nevada Test Site, Novaya Zemlya,
and Lop Nor.92 Another type of nuclear weapon related
experiment is the hydrodynamic experiment, which does not use
86. Review and Update: Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty, COMM. ON INT'L SECURITY & ARMS CONTROL, http://sites.nationalacademies.
org/PGA/cisac/PGA_053215 (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
87. See PERRY ET AL., supra note 85, at 84.
88. See id. at 83.
89. See id. at 81-82.
90. See The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program: Maintaining Confidence in
the Safety and Reliability of the Enduring U.S. Nuclear Weapon Stockhold, FED'N AM.
SCIENTISTS (May 1995), http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/doctrine/doe/st01.htm.
91. See generally JONATHAN MEDALIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34394,
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY: ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS (2008).
92. See Andrew Kishner, U.S. Conducts Subcritical Nuclear Test, OPEDNEWS (Sept. 21,
2010), http://www.opednews.com/artices/U-S-CONDUCTS-SUBCRITICALbyAndrew-
Kishner-100920-795.html; Novaya Zemla Test Site To Be Maintained, NUCLEAR THREAT
INrATIVE [NTIJ (June 28, 2002), http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/treaties/
ctbt2.htm; see also Jeffrey Lewis, "Subcritical Testing at Lop Nor," ARMSCONTROLWONK,
Apr. 3, 2009, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2239/subcritical-testing-at-lop-nor.
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fissile material.93 Neither of these experiments are banned by the
CTBT. On the other hand, hydronuclear experiments, which
involve a small amount of fissile material that could result in
"very slight degree of supercriticality," 94 are prohibited by the
CTBT.95
A recent JASON study found that the primaries of most
weapons systems in the US stockpile and of the plutonium pits in
the nuclear bombs have a life span that exceeds 100 years,96 and
thus proponents of the treaty argue that the United States should
not have a problem maintaining its stockpile under the treaty.
Moreover, they contend that the CTBT would keep other
countries from improving their arsenals, thus "locking in" the US
advantage in this area.97 Treaty supporters believe that without a
test-ban treaty, nuclear programs of other countries pose a
greater threat to US security than with a test-ban treaty because,
without the treaty, other states could develop and test new or
advanced weapons without limitations.98 Critics, however, argue
that it would not be wise to forever relinquish the option to test.99
93. MEDALIA, supra note 91, at 21 n.76; Nuclear Weapon Hydrodynamic Testing,
GLOBALSECURIY, www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/intro/hydrodynamic.htm (last visited
Mar. 14, 2011).
94. ROBERT N. THORN & DONALD R. WESTERVELT, Los ALAMOS NAT'L LAB.,
HYDRONUCLEAR EXPERIMENTS 1 (1987).
95. Suzanne L. Jones & Frank N. von Hippel, Transparency Measures for Subcritical
Experiments under the CTBT, 6 SC. & GLOBAL SEcURY 291, 292 (1997).
96. MITRE CORP., PIT LIFETIME REPORT 1 (2007), available at http://www.fas.org/
irp/agency/dod/jason/pit.pdf.
97. See PERRY ET AL., supra note 85, at 82.
98. Seejennifer Weeks, Nuclear Disarmament: Will President Obama's Efforts Make the
U.S. Safer?, CQ RESEARCHER, Oct. 2, 2009, at 813-36. Former director of Los Alamos
National Laboratory Siegfried Hecker stated,
The single most important reason to ratify the CTBT is to stop other countries
from improving their arsenals-China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran
if it ever progresses that far .... We gain substantially more from limiting
other countries than we lose by giving up testing.
Id; see Addressing the Threat, CONSENSUS FOR AM. SECURITY,
http://www.securityconsensus.org/addressing-the-threat (last visited Apr. 4, 2011). "The
United States must lead the world in reducing the risks of nuclear proliferation to
secure America, our allies and the international system." Id. America has the "modern
and advanced techniques to ensure the safety and reliability of our nuclear
arsenal.. .. We need to enforce a global standard against nuclear testing to inhibit
hostile regimes from developing nuclear weapons." Id.
99. SeeJon Kyl, U.S. Senator, Keynote Address at 2011 Carnegie Int'l Nuclear Policy
Conference (Mar. 29, 2011) (transcript available at http://carnegieendowment.org/
files/Senatorjon-Kyl.pdf).
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While a state that wants to develop nuclear weapons might
not need to conduct a test to build a simple bomb, testing would
be required to build more complex weapons. A report by
General John Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, concluded that the CTBT would enhance US security
because of the United States' conventional military superiority,
extensive nuclear testing experience, and advantages in stockpile
stewardship capability."oo The report also pointed out that other
states that conducted tests below the detection threshold could
not advance their nuclear weapons capabilities, and above that
threshold, the verification capabilities were better than the
opponents thought.101
IV. THE SCOPE OF THE TREATY
Another contentious issue in the US debate over ratification
of the treaty revolves around the fact that although the P5
negotiators agreed that the CTBT should be a zero-yield treaty,
this limitation is not stated in the treaty text. While the
negotiations in Geneva were in a multilateral forum, the P5
conducted among themselves discussions on the side about the
scope of the ban. This continued for some time during the
negotiations, but the five finally agreed on a zero yield, and each
of them announced this in the Conference on Disarmament. 0 2
Nevertheless, opponents believe that Russia and possibly
China are carrying out low-yield tests and that this could give
them a substantial advantage in enhancing their nuclear
weapons, which would result in a military advantage over the
United States.103 They also point to possible evasion scenarios
such as decoupling of underground nuclear tests (which would
100. Letter and Report on the Findings and Recommendations Concerning the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty from John M. Shalikashvili, U.S. General, to
William Clinton, U.S. President (Jan. 4, 2001), available at http://www.state.gov/www/
global/arms/ctbtpage/ctbtreport.html.
101. Id.
102. See JAAP RAMAKER, JENIFER MACKBY, PETER D. MARSHALL, & ROBERT GEIL,
PREPARATORY COMM'N FOR THE CTBTO, THE FINAL TEST: A HISTORY OF THE
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREAIY NEGOTIATIONS (2003).
103. See PERRY ET AL., supra note 85, at 83.
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take place in large underground cavities to reduce the seismic
signal).104
The 1999 testimony of Ambassador Stephen Ledogar, chief
US negotiator for the CTBT, revealed that
[i]n the confidential negotiations among the five nuclear
weapon states that went on the entire time the broader
CTBT negotiations continued, it was clearly understood ...
that the boundary line-the 'zero line' between what would
be prohibited to all under the treaty and what would not be
prohibited-was precisely defined by the question of nuclear
yield or criticality. 05
Thus, there cannot be any critical yield from a nuclear event.
Describing the negotiations in Geneva, Ambassador Ledogar
said, "As the arcane and jargon filled complexities of the nuclear
testing communities in Novaya Zemyla, Lop Nor, Mururoa, and
Nevada became more widely understood, the nonnuclear states
and broad public opinion increasingly insisted that the five
should be allowed no tolerance-not even for the smallest
possible nuclear yields."106
In the same hearing, former Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright stated that the consultations among the nuclear weapon
states led to the achievement of a shared understanding that "all
nuclear explosions, however small, including low-yield
hydronuclear tests, are prohibited, and subcritical experiments
are not prohibited."1 0 7 When asked by Senator Gordon Smith if
the Russians have the same interpretation of zero yield as the
United States, Secretary Albright answered, "Yes. We went
through a negotiating process on this. That is correct, yes."108
Undersecretary of State John Holum also confirmed at the
hearing that the CTBT banned any nuclear test explosion or any
other nuclear explosion, meaning "there cannot be any critical
yield from a nuclear event."109 He said, "You can do things that
104. Id.
105. Final Review of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Hearing before the S. Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 106th Cong. 17-18 (1999) [hereinafter CTBT Hearing] (statement of
Ambassador StephenJ. Ledogar, Chief US Negotiator of the CTBT).
106. Id. at 21.
107. CTBT Hearing, supra note 105 (statement of Madeleine K. Albright, US
Secretary of State).
108. Id at 78.
109. Id. at 99 (statement of Undersecretary of State John Holum).
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do not go critical; you cannot do things that do."110 He also
confirmed that the United States was conducting the same
subcritical experiments as the Russians.'"
In a recent article, one of the key Russian negotiators of the
CTBT suggested that because ratification by the United States is
in Russia's interests, there should be a possibility of confirming
the 2000 official Russian position in the treaty by the State Duma
that "all test explosions of nuclear weapons are banned,
including so-called 'hydronuclear experiments,' whatever the
level of energy released."112 He also reiterated Russia's 2001
proposal to develop with the United States "additional measures
to build trust and improve transparency with regard to activity on
nuclear test sites."113
In 2001, General Igor D. Sergeev, Russia's adviser to former
President Vladimir Putin on strategic stability, stated, "The
unprecedented international verification mechanism being
developed under the CTBT and the available modern national
means of monitoring make it absolutely impossible to hide any
violation of the Treaty."114 Reading a letter from President Putin,
he suggested the possibility of elaborating additional monitoring
measures for nuclear test sites "going far beyond Treaty
provisions. This could include the exchange of geological data
and results of certain experiments, installation of additional
sensors, and other measures."115 Mr. Slipchenko proposed the
possibility of beginning talks on this question soon, without
waiting for the CTBT to enter into force.116 He also suggested
offering economic cooperation with India and Iran to encourage
them to sign and ratify the treaty."7 Current Russian President
Dmitry Medvedev has confirmed that " [u] nder the global ban on
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Viktor Slipchenko, Some Considerations Regarding the Ratification of the CTBT by
the United States, CARNEGIE MOSCOW CTR. (July 24, 2009), http://www.carnegie.ru/
publications/?fa=40415.
113. Id.
114. Igor D. Sergeev, Assistant of President of the Russ. Fed'n on Strategic Stability,
Statement at the Second Conference Facilitating Entry into Force of the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty (Nov. 11, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.un.org/
webcast/ctbt/statements/russiaE.htm).
115. Id.
116. Slipchenko, supra note 112.
117. Id.
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nuclear tests, we can only use computer-assisted simulations to
ensure the reliability of Russia's nuclear deterrent."118
On October 23, 1995, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and
the United States' President William Clinton met in Hyde Park,
New York, and President Clinton announced that he and
President Yeltsin agreed that they would conclude a zero-yield
comprehensive test ban treaty the next year.'19 On April 21, 1996,
following a meeting of the G8 in Moscow, President Yeltsin said,
"All, to the very last one, agreed that this year we've got to sign
the treaty on banning and testing in any size of test forever .... "
President Clinton added,
We have all agreed to go with the so-called Australian
language which is a strict zero-yield comprehensive test ban
treaty. That is the only kind of treaty that can give the people
of the world the certainty that they really are seeing the end
of the nuclear age of the big weapons.120
The Australian delegation played a leading role in the
formulation and promotion of the language on scope that was
finally adopted in the treaty. The chief Australian negotiator,
Ambassador Richard Starr, confirmed that discussions held in
capitals of the five nuclear weapon states were "on the basis of a
clear understanding" that the Australian language meant zero
yield. 121 The Non-Aligned Movement had a similar
understanding, as expressed by Indonesia on their behalf at the
third session of the 2010 NPT Preparatory Committee: "We
support the objective of the CTBT, which is intended to enforce
a comprehensive ban on all forms of nuclear tests without
exception, and to stop the development of nuclear weapons, in
the direction of the total elimination of nuclear weapons." 22
118. Russia to Use Supercomputers to Test Viability of NuclearArsenal, GLOBAL SECURYY
NEWSWIRE, (July 23, 2009), http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20090723_5131.php.
119. William Clinton, U.S. President and Boris Yeltsin, Russ. President, News
Conference in Hyde Park, New York (Oct. 23, 1995) (transcript available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=50688).
120. William Clinton, U.S. President and Boris Yeltsin, Russ. President, Press
Conference at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia (Apr. 21, 1996) (transcript available at
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/w960421b.htm).
121. Interviewwith Richard Starr, Chief Negotiator, Austl. (Jan. 31, 2011).
122. The Delegation of Indon. on behalf of the Grp. of Non-Aligned States Parties,
Statement to the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review
Conference (May 7, 2009).
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While treaty opponents believe that it is impossible to verify
a zero-yield ban and that countries could conduct low-yield tests
without being detected, treaty supporters maintain that the
CTBT is effectively verifiable and that potential violators would
extract little, if any, military value from clandestine testing at
levels that are undetectable.
V. BRIEF HISTORY OF NUCLEAR TESTING
Some 2052 nuclear test explosions were carried out for
more than fifty years in the atmosphere, under water, outer
space, and underground.123 They were detonated in more than
twenty three locations around the world, and the majority, 1500,
were conducted underground. 124 Most of them were conducted
by the United States and the former Soviet Union-China
conducted 45 tests; France 210; the Soviet Union 715; the United
Kingdom 45; and the United States 1032.125 Pakistan and India
have claimed that they conducted five tests each (although there
are questions regarding the actual numbers); North Korea has
tested twice and Israel is not believed to have tested.126 Most of
those conducted by the United States were to research and refine
new nuclear weapons or to study weapons effects.127 Others were
detonated for safety experiments, storage, and transportation,
joint tests with the United Kingdom, and peaceful purposes (e.g.,
large engineering and construction projects).
The Russian Federation and the United States declared a
moratorium in 1992, and they were joined by China and France
in 1996, during the last year of the negotiations on a test-ban
treaty.'28 The United Kingdom tested at the US nuclear test site
123. FRANK BARNABY, How To BUILD A NUCLEAR BOMB AND OTHER WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION 82 (2004).
124. OLA DAHLMAN ET AL., NUCLEAR TEST BAN: CONVERTING POLITICAL VISIONS TO
REALIlY (2009).
125. BARNABY, supra note 123, at 82.
126. See id.; JONATHAN MEDALIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 41160, NORTH
KOREA'S 2009 NUCLEAR TEST: CONTAINMENT, MONITORING, IMPLICATIONS 1 (2010).
127. See NEV. OPERATIONS OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, U.S. NUCLEAR TESTS:
JULY 1945 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1992, at vii (2000), available at http://www.nv.doe.gov/
library/publications/historical/DOENV_209_.REV15.pdf.
128. Ending Nuclear Testing-International Day against Nuclear Tests, UN,
http://www.un.org/en/events/againstnucleartestsday/history.shtml (last visited Feb. 9,
2011).
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and it has not tested since 1992.129 In the United States, the
National Nuclear Security Administration is required to certify
that the country's warheads do not need testing for purposes of
safety and reliability. 30 The many non-nuclear components are
tested and replaced, and computer simulations as well as non-
nuclear experiments are carried out to assist in the Stockpile
Stewardship Program.1'3
VI. HOW MUCH VERIFICATION?
It is difficult to make an overall assessment of how much
verification is sufficient for any given treaty. Experts recognize
that there is no guarantee of 100% verifiability, no matter how
many stations are erected. In 1992, Paul Nitze, the chief US
negotiator of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty,
defined effective verification: "If the other side moves beyond the
limits of the treaty in any militarily significant way, we would be
able to detect such violations in time to respond effectively and
thereby deny the other side the benefit of the violation." 32 Thus,
militarily significant cheating should be detected before it might
threaten national security.
The IMS is meant to provide all states parties the possibility
to monitor the CTBT. Even states parties that do not have the
resources or national monitoring capabilities are provided data
and event bulletins from the IDC, as well as a certain amount of
technical assistance with their national authorities established to
handle issues regarding the CTBTO. States can also request data
from the IMS auxiliary stations.133 In addition, in the last ten
years the number of high quality seismic stations around the
globe that are not part of the IMS has significantly increased.134
129. See Britain's Nuclear Weapons-British Nuclear Testing, NUCLEAR WEAPON
ARCHIVE, http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Uk/UKTesting.html (last updated Aug. 23,
2007).
130. See generally Jeffrey Lewis, After the Reliable Replacement Warhead: What's Next for
the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal?, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Dec. 2008, at 18.
131. See Stockpile Stewardship Program Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY NEV. SITE
OFFICE, (Aug. 2010), http://www.nv.doe.gov/library/factsheets/DOENV_1017.pdf.
132. S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-53, at 27 (1992).
133. See Bharath Gopalaswamy, CTBT Verfication: A System of Ties, CTBTO
SPECTRUM, Nov. 2010, at 16.
134. The Role of Non-IMS Stations in Explosion Monitoring, INT'L SEISMIC CENTRE,
http://www.isc.ac.uk/doc/analysis/2003p08 (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
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This enables states to use data from IMS stations and others that
are well placed to monitor a particular state or area of concern,
assuming they have the ability to analyze the data.
While some countries take an active interest in monitoring
the globe for nuclear testing and devote a large amount of effort
and resources to it, many countries of the world are not very
concerned about nuclear weapon test explosions and for them
the CTBT holds little import. Each country will decide on its level
of participation in the treaty, although it is the states parties-not
the technical secretariat-who will make judgments about the
verification of compliance. Thus they may be called upon to take
part in such decisions and will need to understand the basis of
the treaty.
Furthermore, states are likely to be interested in certain
areas where they believe a nuclear test might take place, rather
than the entire planet. A state could concentrate on selected
information from the bulletin of IDC data regarding specific
areas of concern to it. A state could obtain additional seismic
data from stations outside of the IMS and certain high resolution
satellite observations that are commercially available but not part
of the IMS, as well as human intelligence. If it had the means, it
could also install additional radionuclide stations for its own
national use to increase local detection capabilities. This would
require a certain amount of expertise and resources, however, in
this way a state or group of states could enhance their capability
to monitor and analyze the areas of concern to them.
An International Scientific Study to evaluate the capabilities
of the CTBT verification regime was conducted by hundreds of
scientists around the world from 2008 to 2009.135 They presented
their findings at a conference in June 2009, attended by 600
people from ninety countries, including scientific experts,
diplomats and academics.136 The CTBT monitoring stations have
shown that they produce high-quality data and, with the dramatic
technological and scientific developments that have taken place
135. See generally INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC STUDIES CONFERENCE, SCIENCE FOR
SECURITY (2009).
136. See Scientific Contributions, CTBTO PREPARATORY COMM'N, http://www.ctbto.
org/specials/the-intemational-scientific-studies-project-iss/scientific-contributions (last
visited Apr. 4, 2011).
726 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 34:697
since the treaty was negotiated, their capabilities are greater than
expected by the designers of the system.
VII. ENTRY INTO FORCE
Although the verification machinery required to monitor
the CTBT is eighty percent installed,137 and as mentioned, 153
countries have ratified the treaty,138 entry into force is still
proving to be problematic.
Some have asked whether the countries still needed to ratify
the treaty for it to enter into force, such as North Korea and Iran,
will ratify the treaty even if the United States ratifies. "U.S.
ratification is a critically needed circuit-breaker: it would have an
immediate impact on other holdout states, and add major new
momentum to both disarmament and non-proliferation
efforts." 39 This may seem overly optimistic; however,
international norms impose a powerful influence on states.'"
International instruments and pressures have helped prevent a
number of countries from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Regarding the other holdouts referenced above, Indonesia
had stated that it would ratify as soon as the United States
becomes a state party; however, it announced at the May 2010
Review Conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty that
it would proceed to ratify on its own.1'4 Indonesia signed the
treaty the day it was opened for signature, and its six auxiliary
seismic stations in the IMS are all certified. 42
It is widely believed that China will ratify the treaty soon
after the United States. Like the other P5 countries, China signed
the treaty the day it opened for signature, and the treaty has been
137. See Press Release, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Org., A Decade of
"Remarkable Achievements" in Advancing the CTBT (Nov. 9, 2010).
138. Id.
139. GARETH EVANS & YORIKO KAWAGUCHI, INT'L COMM'N ON NUCLEAR NON-
PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT, ELIMINATING NUCLEAR THREATS: A PRACTICAL
AGENDA FOR GLOBAL POLICYMAKERS 103 (2009).
140. See Michael O'Hanlon, Resurrecting the Test Ban Treaty, SURVIVAL: GLOBAL
POLITICS & STRATEGY, Feb. 2008, at 119, 125 (2008).
141. See Sean Dunlop & Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, Indonesia Takes the Lead on the
CTBT, JAMES MARTIN CTR. FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES (May 4, 2010),
http://cns.miis.edu/stories/100504_indonesiactbt.htm.
142. See CTBT Signatories, supra note 11; see also CTBT Station Profiles, CTBTO
PREPARATORY COMM., http://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/station-profiles
[hereinafter CTBTStation Profiles] (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
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awaiting ratification in the National People's Congress for ten
years. 43 China was active in the negotiations in the CD and has
participated in the work of the CTBT PrepCom, including on
OSI.144 A high level Chinese diplomat in Vienna said, "China
fully cherishes the international norm that any nuclear test after
the CTBT is a violation, including for those countries outside of
the CTBT."145 China has thirteen IMS facilities, most of which are
in the operational or testing phase.'46
In 1954 Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru became the
first to call for a nuclear test ban.147 India has supported the
elimination of nuclear weapons for many years and participated
dynamically in the negotiations in Geneva, serving as Friend of
the Chair on verification and legal issues.148 However, the treaty
did not include India's call for a time-bound framework for
nuclear disarmament and did include India on the list of
countries required to ratify for entry into force. India responded
by withdrawing its four monitoring stations from the IMS and
declaring that it would not approve the treaty in the CD.149
Shortly thereafter, in 1998, India and Pakistan conducted a series
of nuclear tests. 50 India has since observed a moratorium on
testing, and this is considered a condition of the United States
for cooperation on the civil nuclear agreement of 2006.151
In 1999 Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee told the
United Nations General Assembly that India would "not stand in
143. See CTBT Signatories, supra note 11; Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), NTI,
http://www.nti.org/db/china/ctbtorg.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
144. See generally Ambassador Hu Xiaodi, Head of Chinese Delegation, Address at
the 33rd Session of the PrepCom for CTBTO (Nov. 16, 2009).
145. Interview with Chinese Diplomat.
146. See CTBT Station Profiles, supra note 142.
147. See History of Efforts for the CTBT, PROJECT FOR THE COMPREHENSIvE NUCLEAR
TEST BAN TREATY, http://www.projectforthectbt.org/history (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
148. RAMAKER ET AL., supra note 102, at 269, 271.
149. See 1994-1996: Debating the Basic Issues, CTBTO PREPARATORY COMM'N,
http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/1993-1996-treaty-negotiations/1994-96-debating-the-
basic-issues/page-i 1994-96-debating-the-basic-issues (last visited Apr. 4, 2011); 1994-1996
Entry into Force Formula, CTBTO PREPARATORY COMM'N, http://www.ctbto.org/the-
treaty/1993-1996-treaty-negotiations/1994-96-entry-into-force-formula/page-3-1994-96-
entry-into-force-formula (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
150. See William J. Broad, Explosion Is Detected by U.S. Scientists, N.Y. TIMES, May 29,
1998, at A10.
151. See Amelia Gentleman, India and U.S. Try to Rekindle Stalled Talks on a Nuclear
Pact, N.Y. TIMES,June 1, 2007, at All.
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the way" of the treaty coming into force.'52 Nevertheless, others
are not so optimistic, in view of a strong public opinion attached
to the nuclear capability. The four monitoring stations (primary
and auxiliary seismic, radionuclide, and infrasound) that were to
be located in India are currently listed as "to be determined" in
the alphabetical spot where India would appear, 53 and many
assume that they will revert to the list of IMS stations if and when
India signs the treaty.
Pakistan was also active in the negotiations and has attended
a number of meetings of the PrepCom and three of the bi-annual
Conferences on Facilitating Entry into Force of the Treaty
(Article XIV Conferences) as observer. 15 4 Pakistan has supported
the conclusion of a test-ban treaty for many years, and voted for
the treaty at the United Nations in 1996, unlike India.55 It has
also observed a moratorium on nuclear testing since its tests in
1998. It was thought that Pakistan would sign the treaty in
tandem with India; however, Pakistan has recently claimed that
the US-India nuclear deal has affected the imbalance in their
capabilities and that it will act according to its own security
interests.156 Pakistan has a primary seismic and an infrasound
station that are still in the planning stage.'57
Israel also participated actively in the negotiations in the
CD. As an observer it was not permitted to break consensus;
however, it contributed papers and proposed language that were
reflected in the treaty. It was especially interested in the
provisions for on-site inspections, being concerned about the
non-abusive nature of the OSI regime, equal status in the
152. See Seeing CTBT Through, EXPRESS INDIA (May 6, 1999),
http://www.expressindia.com/ie/daily/19990506/iexO6O62.html.
153. Annex 1 to the Protocol, FED'N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, http://www.fas.org/nuke/
control/ctbt/text/artbyart/anxl-pro.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
154. See Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Vienna, Austria, Sept. 3-5, 2003, U.N. Doc. CTBT-
Art.XIV/2003/5 (Sept. 11, 2003); Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Vienna, Austria, Oct. 6-8, 1999, U.N. Doc.
CTBT-Art.XIV/1999/5 (Oct. 8, 1999); see also Kaegan McGrath, Enty into Force of the
CTBT: All Roads Lead to Washington, NTI, (Apr. 2008), http://www.nti.org/e-research/
e3_entry-intoforcectbt.html.
155. See 1996: CTBT: A Long-Sought Success, CTBTO PREPARATORY COMM.,
http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/1993-1996-treaty-negotiations/1996-ctbt-a-long-sought-
success/page-1-1996-ctbt-a-long-sought-success (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
156. Noor ul Haq, Preface, ISLAMABAD POL'Y RES. INST. [IPRI] FACTFILE, Apr. 2006.
157. CTBT Station Profiles, supra note 142.
2011]NONPROLIFERATION AND THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN 729
Executive Council (which will make the decisions about OSI),
and adherence to the treaty by other Middle Eastern states. As
the Executive Council is composed of regional blocs, Israel is
concerned that it will never be given a seat in the group
encompassing the Middle East and South Asia. Although many
do not think that this will prevent Israel from ratifying, Israel is
unlikely to let its rights be compromised. 58 Israel continues to
participate in the deliberations in the PrepCom, in particular on
the OSI operational manual, training, and exercises. 59 It has two
certified auxiliary seismic stations and a radionuclide laboratory
on the IMS list.160
Iran served in the negotiations as Friend of the Chair on
aspects of verification and on-site inspections. 61 It signed the
treaty on the day it opened for signature, voted in favor of the
CTBT resolution in 2009 and has engaged in the meetings of the
PrepCom, in particular in the Working Group on Verification. 6 2
It has six stations in the IMS, one primary seismic station that has
been certified, two auxiliary seismic stations in the testing phase,
two planned radionuclide stations and a planned infrasound
station. The controversy in the United Nations and the IAEA
surrounding Iran's nuclear activities has influenced its
participation in international discussions and may affect its path
towards ratification of the CTBT. Iran contends that its activities
are related to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and has insinuated
that it will link ratification to the CTBT with the establishment of
158. Interview with high level Israeli Diplomat.
159. See Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Teaty, New York, U.S., Sept. 21-23, 2005, List of Participants at the
Conference, U.N. Doc. CTBT-Art.XIV/2005/INF.4 (Oct. 10, 2005); Conference on
Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Teaty, Vienna,
Austria, Sept. 17-18, 2007, List of Participants at the Conference, U.N. Doc. CTBT-
Art.XIV/2007/INF.4 (Oct. 10, 2007).
160. CTBT Station Profiles, supra note 142.
161. See RAMAKER ET AL., supra note 102, at 270, 273.
162. See CTBT Signatories, supra note 11; see also Conference on Facilitating the
Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Teaty, Vienna, Austria, Sept.
17-18, 2007, List of Participants, U.N. Doc. CTBT-Art.XIV/2007/INF.4 (Oct. 10, 2007);
Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Teaty, New York, U.S., Sept. 21-23, 2005, List of Participants at the Conference, U.N. Doc.
CTBT-Art.XIV/2005/INF.4 (Oct. 10, 2005); Recorded Vote in the General Assembly on
G.A. Res. 64/31, U.N. OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, http://unhq-appspub-
01.un.org/UNODA/vote.nsf.
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a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction. 63 The
argument has been made that if Iran is serious about its claim
that it is not developing nuclear weapons, it would ratify the
CTBT. It is one of the 118 members of the Non-Aligned
Movement, which has voiced its support of the CTBT on a
number of occasions. 164 At its 2009 summit, the Non-Aligned
Movement ("NAM") stressed the significance of universal
adherence to the CTBT.165 Iran will chair the NAM in 2012.166
Egypt was also active in the CTBT negotiations and served as
Chairman of the Working Group and moderator on legal
issues.167 It holds the view that it has been in good standing with
the NPT, and until Israel ratifies the NPT to address what Egypt
sees as an imbalance in regional nonproliferation and
disarmament, it will not support further arms control
agreements, including the CTBT, the Chemical Weapons
Convention, the Pelindaba Treaty, or the IAEA Additional
Protocol. 168 One of the priorities for Egypt is the establishment of
a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction. 169 The provision for such a zone was encompassed in
the decision taken in 1995 to extend the NPT indefinitely, and
the NAM countries voice resentment that this provision has not
been honored. 170 The 2010 NPT Review Conference decided to
hold a conference in 2012 on a zone free of weapons of mass
destruction in the Middle East,171 and it remains to be seen how
much progress will be made. Egypt's primary array and auxiliary
163. Interview with high level Iranian Diplomat.
164. See The Non-Aligned Movement: Member States, NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT,
http://www.nam.gov.za/background/members.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2011).
165. See Final Document, XV Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the
Non-Aligned Movement, July 11-16, 2009, available at www.namegyppt.org/en/
RelevantDocuments/Pages/default.aspx.
166. See Iran to Head NAM, IRAN TIMES INT'L (Wash., D.C.), May 8, 2009, available at
LEXIS.
167. See RAMAKER ET AL., supra note 102, at 271.
168. See, e.g., Press Release, Egypt Ministry of Foreign Aff., Meetings of the Third
Session of the Preparatory Comm. for the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review
Conference (May 4, 2010), available at http://www.mfa.gov.eg/English/
EgyptianForeignPolicy/InternationalOrgRelation/DisArm/Pages/DiArm452009
nptnewyork.aspx.
169. See Egypt: Nuclear Country Profile, NTI, http://www.nti.org/e_research/
profiles/egypt/nuclear (last updated Mar. 2011).
170. See 1995 Review and Extension Conference, supra note 17, at 13.
171. See 2010 NPT Review Conference, supra note 6, at 30.
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seismic stations are planned but have not been installed. 7 2 A
high-level diplomat said that Egypt might not install this key array
until the prospects for entry into force are more positive.173
North Korea is very difficult to assess, due to its closed and
secluded situation in the international arena. It participated in
the negotiations and voted for the UN resolution that adopted
the treaty.174 It conducted two nuclear weapon explosions, in
2006 and 2009, and has not indicated plans in regard to the
CTBT. This could be considered in the six-party talks, assuming
they resume.175 The DPRK test in 2006 was detected by twenty-two
seismic stations of the IMS, even though its yield was only about
0.5 kilotons.17 6 Additionally, the radionuclide station at
Yellowknife, Canada detected xenon-133 coming from the test
7000 km away.177 The analysis of data from IMS radionuclide
stations is assisted by weather "backtracking" information, e.g.,
movement of atmosphere or wind patterns, which is supplied by
the World Meteorological Organization. 7 8 Sixty-one seismic
stations detected the slightly larger North Korean nuclear test of
May 2009, although no radionuclides were detected in that
instance.'79 There are no IMS stations to be installed in North
Korea. 80
The United States has five primary, twelve auxiliary, eight
infrasound, two hydroacoustic and eleven radionuclide stations.
All of them are certified except for three of the infrasound
stations, which are in the planning stage.
172. CTBT Station Profiles, supra note 142.
173. Interview with Egyptian Diplomat.
174. CTBT Signatories, supra note 11.
175. LARRY A. NIKSCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33590, NORTH KOREA'S
NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT AND DIPLOMACY 3 (2010).
176. See R. Le Bras et al., CTBTO Seismic Processing and the Announced DPRK Nuclear
Test of October 9, 2006, 9 GEOPHYSICAL RES. ABSTRACTS (2007), http://meetings.
copernicus.org/www.cosis.net/abstracts/EGU2007/07286/EGU2 00 7-J-0 72 86- 2.pdf.
177. The CTBT Verification Regime Put to the Test-The Event in the DPRK on 9 October
2006, CTBTO PREPARATORY COMM., http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/
2007/the-ctbt-verification-regime-put-to-the-test-the-event-in-the-dprk-on-9-october-2006
(last visited Apr. 5, 2011).
178. CTBTO PREPARATORY COMM., ANNUAL REPORT 2006, at 22 (2007).
179. Press Release, CTBTO Preparatory Comm., Experts Sure about Nature of the
DPRK Event (June 12, 2009), available at http://www.ctbto.org/press-
centre/highlights/2009/experts-sure-about-nature-of-the-dprk-evenL
180. See, e.g., CTBT Station Profiles, supra note 145.
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CONCLUSION
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires
states parties to a treaty to refrain from actions that would "defeat
the object and purpose" of the treaty.18' Thus far CTBT member
states have not tested, even though the treaty has not entered
into force. Nevertheless, entry into force would constitute a
legally binding norm, while a moratorium constitutes an
indeterminate status that could more easily be broken.
Furthermore, not all countries have subscribed to a moratorium.
Academic and research experts have occasionally espoused
theories about the possibility of provisional application of the
CTBT as a last resort.182 If the international community is
blocked by a small number of intransigent states, it has been
suggested that rather than wait for an indefinite period of time,
the states parties could agree among themselves that the treaty
has entered into force for them.183 This would present many
cumbersome legal, financial, and logistical questions relating to
ownership of the stations, acquiring data from states not party to
the treaty, recalculating the dues for each country, and other
complex matters. Thus most experts have opposed the
provisional entry into force, believing that it would provide a
screen behind which nonparties could hide and delay the full
entry into force indefinitely.'8 4 The idea was considered during
the negotiations but has not been raised in the meetings of the
PrepCom.
Given the political climate in the United States and the
number of urgent matters competing for legislative action, it
seems unlikely that President Obama will bring the treaty before
the Senate in the near future. The implementation of the treaty's
monitoring and verification regime can continue, although on-
site inspections will not be possible until entry into force. It
remains to be seen whether international attention will focus
more on potential proliferation than on possible future testing.
Although the predictions of the 1960s that there would soon be
181. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
182. See ANTHONY AUST ET AL., INT'L GROUP OF GLOBAL SECURIY, A NEw LOOK AT
THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY (CTBC) 45-56 (2008).
183. See id.
184. See id
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many more nuclear weapon states has not come about, it is not
clear whether the world is safer and more secure without a treaty
that prohibits nuclear testing.
